narrating Morna's death. Quite inauthentically and therefore pointedly, Macpherson's mimesis of first-person lyric orality animistic projection from the inside out and embodied reading from the outside in is forcefully exemplified by the fragment primitive, animistic projection but by bodily observation [...] as an act of reading" (58, 65). The distinction between particular their folk-psychological ability to attribute beliefs, desires, emotions, and intentions to others "not as an act of "In Macpherson's hands," he writes, "ancient poetry carries with it primitive models of relationships between minds," in English Poetry fragments of Ancient Poetry (1760). Thanks to his education at the University of Aberdeen, Macpherson would have been exposed both to Blackwell's primitive poetics of sensation and feeling and to Thomas Reid's commonsense philosophy of intellectual powers, including the early-developing ability to read "natural signs" of others' thoughts and feelings through their facial expressions, gestures, and intonations (58). In light of this background, Savarese observes, persisted through and well beyond the Romantic period, resurfacing in everything from J. S. Mill's tendentious ranking of poetry's instrumental role in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century theories of humans' socio-cognitive endowment and development. While Locke, Hume, and Kant conceived the individual mind as an essentially private realm of sensational, passionate, and rational experience, Savarese shows that a broad countercurrent of cultural-anthropological conjecture about linguistic and literary origins led to alternative models of the human mind "that variously emphasized the impersonal, the intersubjective, and the collective" (4) and that accordingly prefigure today's "4E" model of the embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended mind. The competing claims for lyric and narrative minds and kinds, Savarese observes, resulted in a "common model derived from the native ballad traditions. While ancient verse was said to voice essentially private experience in an overheard poetry of imagery, feeling, and figure, ballad verse such as Thomas Percy's Reliques of Ancient English Poetry (1765) and Joseph Ritson's Ancient Songs (1790) appeared more intrinsically social both in its cognitive foundations and its expressive functions. The competing claims for lyric and narrative minds and kinds, Savarese observes, endured through and well beyond the Romantic period, resurfacing in everything from J. S. Mill's tendentious ranking of lyric above narrative in "What is Poetry" (1833) to contemporary cognitive literary studies, which likewise attribute different cognitive origins and functions to the different genres (5-13). Recounted in chapter 1, this antiquarian debate sets the context for the four case studies that follow, beginning with James Macpherson's Fragments of Ancient Poetry (1760). Thanks to his education at the University of Aberdeen, Macpherson would have been exposed both to Blackwell's primitive poetics of sensation and feeling and to Thomas Reid's commonsense philosophy of intellectual powers, including the early-developing ability to read "natural signs" of others' thoughts and feelings through their facial expressions, gestures, and intonations (58). In light of this background, Savarese "frames the Ossian project as an intervention in then-current theories of ancient poetry, which made the ancient text the site of information about the primitive mind" (44). While Blackwell, Lowth, and Blair construed the primitive mind as fundamentally personal, private, and pre-social, Savarese argues that Macpherson stressed instead its embodied sociability. "In Macpherson's hands," he writes, "ancient poetry carries with it primitive models of relationships between minds," in particular their folk-psychological ability to attribute beliefs, desires, emotions, and intentions to others "not as an act of primitive, animistic projection but by bodily observation [...] as an act of reading" (58, 65). The distinction between anamistic projection from the inside out and embodied reading from the outside in is forcefully exemplified by the fragment narrating Morna's death. Quite inauthentically and therefore pointedly, Macpherson's mimesis of first-person lyric orality
models of social cognition were scaffolded by eighteenth-century antiquarian poetics and British Romantic experiments in transmission, and natural affordances and agencies somewhere in between. But this is just Savarese's point: these various which nonetheless prompts at least one objection regarding the category of the "social" itself. Savarese might have more truer) sciences of mind and poetry. The functional differentiation model has not only survived but now prevails in (161). In this respect, Savarese suggests, the pseudo-science of antiquarian conjectural history at last matured into true (or automatic modes of cultural transmission" such as popular ballad poetry and song that the novel is supposed to supersede. Yet just as Scott's narrator presents him sympathetically and, indeed, instrumentally from beginning to end, so the extended mind works more easily, drinking in moral wisdom ready-made from nature rather than arduously acquiring it through disciplinary toil and trouble. Wordsworth stages a conflict between these two externalist modes of socio-cognitive formation in "Expostulation and Reply" and "The Tables Turned." But elsewhere he admits that by itself, nature's ready-made wisdom cannot ensure the healthy development of the social mind; in a letter of March 6, 1804 he advised a young De Quincey to "love Nature and Books; seek these and you will be happy." Wordsworth is not a primitivist. Though he indulges the antiquarian method of conjectural history to project this natural-constructivist theory onto the "primitive" mind of his own early childhood, Savarese suggests that, in terms of his poetic practice, Wordsworth's love of nature follows from his love of mankind rather than leading to it. Throughout Lyrical Ballads and even as late as "The Leech-gatherer," Wordsworth is said to have primarily engaged with "debates about rustic language" and "the collective scaffolding of the ordinary mind" (108). Primitivist claims in the "Preface" to Lyrical Ballads notwithstanding, he effectively endorses the Coleridgean position that the "best part" of ordinary language results from what Savarese calls "a built environment that structure[s] and scaffold[s] the individual mind" (112). Hence, Savarese contends, the Leech-gatherer's "choice word and measured phrase; above the reach / Of ordinary men," owes more to the influence of "godly Books" than to nature (120-123), and hence, more generally, Wordsworth's poetics aims to "refine[s] thinking in the vernacular" (114).

For Savarese, however, 1802 marks a "transitional moment" in which Wordsworth "tries to reframe [such] cultural scaffolds as features of the mind's interaction with the natural world" (108). This new line of thinking culminates in the development and redisposition of key passages of The Prelude (Spots of Time, Blind Beggar, Snowdon) to emphasize "the kind of poetic 'power' Wordsworth is trying to name—once that looks like nature thinking for him and that, while it resembles analogy, emblem, or allegory, is assembled by the world rather than by the mind" (132).

In his final case study, Savarese investigates Davie Gellatley in Walter Scott's Waverley as a character who embodies the entanglement of cognitive and poetic origins in a biologically non-normative and socially outmoded way. Though Savarese allusively links Davie to Wordsworth's "Idiot Boy," Savarese contrasts the two representations of mental disability, especially insofar as "Scott's treatment of Davie more closely resembles the cognitive-scientific model of localized, functionally specific impairment," in which "discrete and separable faculties can be selectively under- or over-developed" (142). In Davie's case, an obviously overdeveloped capacity to memorize traditional song and verse is coupled with an underdeveloped capacity for social interaction. If Waverley marks Scott's farewell to naive poetry in favor of sentimental fiction, his representation of Davie might be understood to imply that the socially progressive mind has outweighed poetry both cognitively and culturally. Yet just as Scott's narrator presents him sympathetically and, indeed, instrumentally from beginning to end, so the disenchanched Highland society of Waverley incorporates Davie cheerfully and enduringly. For Savarese, these accommodations indicate a much deeper relationship than the mere shift to "sentimental narrative" from the "more rote, automatic modes of cultural transmission" such as popular ballad poetry and song that the novel is supposed to supersede (150). Like Macpherson, Savarese writes, "Scott . . . suggests that turning back to traditional poetry may be a way to defamiliarize what sociability means in the first place and to generate new alternatives" (163).

But in many ways, Scott's socio-cognitive alternative is the reverse of Macpherson's. Besides the fact that Davie's mind is insurmountably inscrutable to other minds (including the narrator's), Savarese finds Waverley generically modern insofar as its "disenchanted trajectory ultimately looks toward the ballad as a modernizing form rather than as the premodern vestige the sentimental novel leaves in its wake" (150).The most striking proof of this claim comes by way of Robert Chambers, author of both Illustrations of the Author of Waverley (1825) and Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation (1844). The first book considers almost clinically a possible real-life prototype for Davie; the second one, Savarese argues, reprises the implied argument of the first in more systematic anthropological terms: terms that directly influenced Charles Darwin's conception of the "automatic basis of human actions" arising from "the functionally differentiated mind" (161). In this respect, Savarese suggests, the pseudo-science of antiquarian conjectural history at last matured into true (or at least truer) sciences of mind and poetry. The functional differentiation model has not only survived but now prevails in contemporary cognitive science and, closer to home, in cognitive literary studies from its beginnings in the early 1990s (10-11).

Perforce, I have merely sampled the wide-ranging archaeologies and provocative arguments on offer in this book, which nonetheless prompts at least one objection regarding the category of the "social" itself. Savarese might have more exactly defined and more consistently applied this category, for here it may mean anything from Shaftesbury's moral sense to Simon Baron-Cohen's mindreading, with intersubjective belief and trust, traditions of oral practice and textual transmission, and natural affordances and agencies somewhere in between. But this is just Savarese's point: these various models of social cognition were scaffolded by eighteenth-century antiquarian poetics and British Romantic experiments in
ancient poetry, measured prose, poetic autobiography, and sentimental fiction, in ways that influenced their subsequent
development in the sciences proper, from the mid-nineteenth century to this very day. From the opposite direction, the
stubborn plurality of models raises another possible objection, but one that may be just as easily answered: in a more
exhaustive study of the works of the authors treated here, each might be shown to have advocated or experimented with all
these hypothetical possibilities and more, from primitive sensational solipsism and animism to progressive technological
scaffolding that at once reproduces and resists the prevailing economic and political conditions that make it possible. But
again, that's just the point: the Romantic mind was not one individual, private, and unified thing, but many possible things,
from that Cartesian archetype to its functionally diversified antithesis in what we now understand as proto-evolutionary
theory. Rather than exhausting his topic, Savarese offers a richly suggestive and satisfying cultural history of romantic
poetics that may be equally recommended as an exemplary study in cognitive historicism.

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