With the increasing appreciation of the nature of
marginalia as a genre, Hazard Adams's study of Blake's is a timely
one. Adams has the fine talents of discussing difficult passages
lucidly without simplifying their meanings, and, to paraphrase what
he say of Blake's notes on Bacon (82), of finding the reasons for
Blake's disagreements not on the surface but in what lurks beneath
The
ten books that Blake annotated are taken in what is thought to be the
chronological order of his reading them, beginning with Johann Caspar
Lavater's Aphorisms on Man
(English edition, 1788), whose importance to Blake is hard to
over-estimate. He himself had engraved the frontispiece after a
drawing by his friend Henry Fuseli, and Fuseli had translated the
text. In Lavater, Blake saw a combination of Christian humanism and
Enlightenment values, which Blake called "true Christian
philosophy" (9). In the Aphorisms
Blake found affirmations of intense enjoyment, individual genius, the
inter-relatedness of God and man, and (as Adams points out) empathy.
Lavater's book also made Blake highly aware of the aphorism as a
rhetorical form, one that he found congenial and used in his early
tractates There Is No Natural Religion
and All Religions Are One.
Blake did not, however, receive Lavater's views uncritically, but
accepted the author's invitation to write marginal comments on those
that made him "uneasy." Among these is the notion of Vice,
which Blake considers "a Negative," but which he accuses
Lavater of making "Staminal," thus anticipating his own
doctrine of Contraries and Negations in The
Marriage of Heaven and Hell and later. Blake
concludes this paragraph by saying: "But the or[i]gin of this
mistake in Lavater & his contemporaries, is. They suppose that
Womans Love is Sin. In Consequence all the Loves & Graces with
them are Sin." As always, Blake totalizes here: he traces the
cause of Lavater's "mistake" not to anything Lavater says
explicitly, but to its root: "Blake knows [Lavater] is a
Protestant clergyman and assumes that he accepts
the doctrine of original sin as expressed by the Biblical story of
Eve and the apple" (17). And even in these earliest known
annotations of his, "Blake's radical position is that everything
arises from and exists in an original and endless act of imagination
in which we all participate" (19).
Next
in chronological order are Blake's annotations to Swedenborg,
prefaced by Adams's succinct explanations of Swedenborg's doctrines
in his Treatise concerning Heaven and Hell.
(The best detailed expositions of these are Lars Berquist's in his
extraordinary biography, Swedenborg's Secret
[London: Swedenborg Society, 2005]). Blake annotated the second
edition, published by R. Hindmarsh, but read by Blake no earlier than
1787. (There are only three notes, one of which refers the reader to
"Worlds in Universe" or
Concerning the Earths
in our Solar System,
which first appeared in English in that year). The one note that
applies to Swedenborg's text has to do with a passage about the
plurality of heavens and hells, which concludes that "both
Heaven and the World of Spirits may be considered as convexities,
under which are arrangements of those infernal mansions." On
this Blake writes: "under every Good
is a hell. i.e. hell is the outward or external of heaven. & is
the body of the lord. For nothing is destroyed." As Adams
observes, "He is also emphasizing a relation of the inner world
to the outer that is similar to his own imagery." This hopeful
reading of Swedenborg, which aims to accommodate his views to Blake's
own, is again to be found in Blake's numerous comments on The
Wisdom of Angels, concerning Divine Love and Divine Wisdom
(English translation 1788). In many of these, as Adams says, "Blake
seems to be a friendly interpreter" (49). When Blake reads "Is
not one and the same Essence one and the same Identity?" he
responds: "Answer Essence is not Identity but from Essence
proceeds Identity & from one Essence may proceed many Identities.
. . . Surely this is an oversight." However, when he comes to
annotate The Wisdom of the Angels concerning
the Divine Providence (1790), Blake stops
pushing the envelope. Indeed, at times Blake seems to misunderstand
Swedenborg, especially on the subject of predestination, on which, as
Adams remarks, "Blake misreads Swedenborg, perhaps deliberately"
(57). For some reason (much discussed in both Blakean and
Swedenborgian circles), Blake had turned against Swedenborg in a
short period of time. There are later statements about the Swedish
visionary in Blake's poetry and prose, and in at least one picture
(the lost Spiritual Preceptor,
exhibited in 1809), but we have no further annotations to his works.
Blake
had no such problem in judging Bishop Richard Watson's An
Apology for the Bible (1796), which he read
in 1798. The Apology
was addressed to Thomas Paine and attempted to refute the arguments
of Part Two of The Age of Reason.
The conjunction of Blake, Paine, and Watson is in a way a curious
one. Watson was not an arch-reactionary but a latitudinarian, a
Whig, and a one-time supporter of the French Revolution. Paine was
a Deist who rejected revelation. Nevertheless, Blake saw Watson's
Apology as a defense
of monarchy and of the established church (which it was), and Paine's
Age of Reason as an
attack on both (which it was). For Blake, Paine incarnates the fiery
principle of revolution, and, as Adams puts it, "goes so far as
to claim that the Holy Ghost spoke through Paine. "(73). Blake
agrees with Paine that the Old Testament Prophets were poets (a view
that had gathered currency as a result of the writings of Bishop
Robert Lowth), but regarded the substance of prophecy as figurative
or symbolic, agreeing with Paine "that predicting events was not
the prophets' purpose" (77). For both, Watson's literal view of
prophecy is confounded by the fact "that Jonah's prophecy of
Nineveh was wrong" (77). While Watson defends the literal truth
of such narratives as God's ordering the slaughter of the Canaanites,
Paine denies that God would have ordered this, and Blake regards this
divine command as a pretense of the Israelites. In such instances,
Blake, in Adams's words "takes a third position" (70).
Adams is highly skilled at untangling such threads, while recognizing
that Blake's vehemence throughout is directed at Watson, whom Blake
regards as a hypocritical time-server.
The
furiously adversarial nature of Blake's notes to Francis Bacon's
Essays Moral, Economical, and Political
(Bacon was to become par of the demonic triad "Bacon
& Newton & Locke"
in Milton and
Jerusalem)
exemplifies something curious about Blake's marginalia as we have
them. Blake appears to have selected for annotation mainly authors
he detested. Of the thirteen volumes extant, only four - the first
three mentioned above, and Berkeley's Siris
- elicit largely positive remarks. Those on Bacon are remarkably
savage. Sometimes it is easy to understand Blake's antipathy, as
when Bacon advocates leaving the practice of art to "strangers,"
while the citizens of a country are "tillers of the ground, free
servants; and handicraftsmen of strong and manly arts, as smiths,
masons, carpenters, &c: not reckoning professed soldiers"
(89). Blake replies: "Bacon calls Intellectual Arts Unmanly
Poetry Painting Music are in his opinion Useless & so they are
for Kings & Wars & shall in the End Annihilate them";
and when Bacon praises the Roman Triumph as "one of the wisest
and noblest institutions that ever was" (88), Blake writes:
"what can be worse than this or more foolish[?]." When
Bacon calls religion, justice, counsel, and treasure "the four
pillars of government" (87), Blake wittily ripostes that these
pillars are "of different heights and sizes." As Adams
remarks, there are some Baconian remarks that Blake must have agreed
with, such as the denunciation of a king "that setteth to sale
seats of justice," "a prodigal king," and a king
subject to flatterers (85). However, "The fundamental reasons
for Blake's disagreements with Bacon," as Adams puts it, "are
not often on the surface of his notes, but ... lurk beneath"
(83). In the Essays
Bacon assumes a world without political or social change and
addresses those who would succeed in ruling it. For Blake this is
"Good Advice for Satans Kingdom" (83).
Blake was no more charitable to Henry Boyd, a Church of
Ireland clergyman who published the second complete English
translation of The Divine Comedy
in 1798. Blake's notes are not to Boyd's execrable translation, but
to his two preliminary essays. A major disagreement is with Boyd's
emphasis on a moral role for literature. To this Blake responds: "If
Homers merit was only in these Historical combinations & Moral
sentiments he would be no better than Clarissa" (101). While
Boyd, in Adams's words, thinks "Dante appeals to our natural
feelings on which Christian morality is based" (99), Blake
asserts, "Nature teaches nothing of Spiritual Life but only of
Natural Life" (100). Sometimes, as Adams says, Boyd's
insistence upon morally good heroes "irritates Blake ... and
leads to a certain amount of hyperbole (100-1). When Boyd claims that
some of Shakespeare's heroes gain sympathy because of the wrongs they
have suffered, Blake's retort is " the grandest Poetry is
Immoral the Grandest characters Wicked.
Very Satan. Capanius Othello a murderer. Prometheus. Jupiter.
Jehovah, Jesus a wine bibber" (103). Here we are back to the
transgressive Jesus of The
Marriage of Heaven and Hell.
Another major disagreement is, in the
broadest sense, political. When Boyd blames the decline of Rome on
"universal toleration," Blake ringingly asks, "What
is Liberty without Universal Toleration." Blake does not,
however, idealize Dante - he says that "Dante was an Emperors a
Caesars Man"(105)," foreshadowing the inscriptions Blake
later wrote in his illustrations to The Divine
Comedy.
The longest chapter on a single book in Blake's
Margins concerns the annotations to Sir
Joshua Reynolds's Discourses on Art.
Adams has been thinking about this subject for a long time, for
while none of the other chapters has appeared in print before, this
is a revised and expanded version of an essay first published in
1978. These factors of space and time are appropriate to a subject
that Blake treated at considerable length over a period of several
years. Blake is bitterly partisan against the man whom he saw as
embodying an art establishment from which Blake himself had been
excluded. He considers Reynolds a hypocrite (for elevating history
painting while making his fortune in portraiture), a scurvy
politician (for getting to be the founding President of the Royal
Academy), and a bad artist. Blake recognizes that his views spring
partly from resentment, but we must also remember that he was an
artist, not an art historian. He is not striving for a balanced view
of Reynolds. He takes what he can use, and rejects the rest. We
read these annotations not to learn about Reynolds, but to learn
about Blake, who sometimes finds himself agreeing with the man he
elsewhere reviles. When Reynolds says, "Few have been taught
to any purpose, who have not been their own teachers, Blake responds
"True!" (121). And when Reynolds declares that "A
firm and determined outline is one of the characteristics of the
great style in painting," Blake says "A Noble Sentence"
(125). Both praise Poussin, and both agree that Rubens fails in
coloring and outline.
Nevertheless, Blake seizes every chance to disagree.
Where Reynolds allows Rubens some positive qualities (invention and
richness of composition, among others), Blake allows Rubens nothing.
While Reynolds posits a traditional hierarchy of genres, finding
room even for flower painting, Blake sees all art aspiring toward
sublimity. (Beauty, as Adams notes, is seldom invoked by Blake with
respect to paintings, but is subsumed into the sublime). Sometimes
where one would think there was agreement, Blake will not credit
Reynolds's sincerity, calling him "A Liar" when Reynolds
tells how his ignorance of Raphael turned into admiration, and
writing a satirical epigram on Reynolds's ending his discourses with
the name of Michelangelo (110, 136).
A more general disagreement concerns their different
views of form, both in general and with respect to works of art. In
Blake's view, Reynolds uses a Lockeian model of the mind to argue for
the existence of "ideal beauty" (p. 123), resulting in
contradictions that Blake thinks Reynolds cannot resolve. (Of course
Blake does not feel obliged to give an argument for his own
thoroughgoing idealism here.) In summarizing their differences,
Adams brings in the trope of synecdoche. For Blake, Adams says, "a
poetic image is always individual."
What remains is to show [he continues] that it is also
universal. This Blake does not demonstrate in the annotations. The
missing link in his argument is assertion of the logic of metaphor,
in this case the synecdoche, where an individual being is identified
with some larger thing that it is part of. Blake's notion is that
intense vision into a particular thing reveals its metaphorical
identity with the larger thing, indeed with all things. Small things
as well as supposedly overwhelming (according to Burke) large things
are sublime. Looked into, they reveal themselves as infinite. (123).
Here, as so often, Adams makes Blake's thought
accessible in non- "Blakean" terms, thereby opening it up
to a wider circle of readers.
Blake's fewest annotations to a book he is known to
have owned were to Observations on the
Deranged Mind, or Insanity (1817)
by J. C. Spurzheim.
According to Spurzheim and his former teacher
Franz Joseph Gall, the founder of the pseudo-science of phrenology,
the nature of a person's faculties could be found in the conformation
of his or her skull, which they thought followed the physical form of
the brain. Blake had enough interest in this to allow a phrenologist,
James S. Deville, to take
his life mask, and phrenology may also have had an impact on some of
Blake's Visionary Heads. However, Blake made only two notes on
Spurzheim, one of which is slight. The other, which is of great
interest, exists only in a transcription by E. J. Ellis and W. B.
Yeats for
their Works of
William Blake Poetic,
Symbolic, and Critical
(London: Bernard Quaritch, 1893). It concerns William Cowper, whose
poetry and letters Blake admired, and who had died insane in 1800.
Blake knew the details of Cowper's derangement as a result of having
worked with Cowper's biographer, William Hayley, while engraving the
illustrations for Hayley's book. In Blake's vision Cowper comes to
him wishing to be always mad and marveling at Blake's "madness":
"You retain health & yet are as mad as any of us all. - mad
as a refuge from unbelief - from Bacon, Newton, and Locke"
(146). Of course this is Aesopian language that affirms Blake's
essential sanity in what is believed to be a world of only material
objects. Blake, who knew himself to be considered a madman by some
of his contemporaries, would have agreed with the pacifist who said:
"Our world is rational but not sane."
The author whom Blake is known to have annotated with
the greatest sympathy is George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne. It's
clear that Blake thought Berkeley was going in the right direction,
but not far enough. In explaining his notion of the One, Berkeley
writes: "It is ... the truer nature of God, to suppose him
neither made up of parts, nor to be Himself a part of any whole
whatsoever .... Nor is the Supreme Being united to the world as the
soul of an animal is to its body" (155). Blake replies in a bit
of creative misreading: "Imagination or the Human Eternal Body
in Every Man," and "Imagination or the Divine Body in Every
Man." When Berkeley employs the beautiful expression "the
children of imagination grafted upon sense" for the "phantoms'"
that have their origin in natural appearances, his example is "pure
space." Blake chooses to correct the philosopher with "The
All in Man the Divine Image or Imagination" (156). When Blake
annotated Reynolds, he countered the author point by point, but in
the Berkeley marginalia, as Adams puts it, "it is sometimes as
if Blake was running a discourse oblique to Berkeley's, although
alongside it" (158). Blake does not contradict Berkeley but
carries the bishop's' arguments, up to a point much like Blake's own,
into territories beyond the author's discourse.
The only poet whose work Blake is known to have
annotated was William Wordsworth, whose Poems
of 1815 and Excursion
were loaned to him by Wordsworth's friend Henry Crabb Robinson.
Blake's response to Wordsworth was ambivalent. "Blake implies
there are two Wordsworths," says Adams, "one visionary and
one possessed of the Devil" (175). Where Wordsworth admires
"How exquisitely the individual Mind / ... to the external
World/ Is fitted," Blake says "You shall not bring me down
to believe such fitting & fitted" (167). For Blake the
source of all art, including poetry, is the Imagination, which is
beyond the senses. Yet in some of Wordsworth's poems Blake found
intuitions that matched his own. He was, according to Henry Crabb
Robinson, deeply moved by the Immortality Ode, and he considered
Wordsworth "the only
poet of the age" (161). Yet Blake could not accept Wordsworth's
statements about poetry:
"I do not know who wrote these Prefaces," he
wrote, "they are very mischievous & direct contrary to
Wordsworth's own Practise" (175). Blake is far from the only
reader to find the 1815 "Essay Supplementary to the Preface"
at odds with and even contrary to Wordsworth's greatest poems. In
addition, for Blake, with his hatred of Locke and his tradition,
there is a special problem in Wordsworth's use of Hartleian
terminology. In the "Essay Supplementary," the Hartleian
doctrine of association is as important to the imagination as it is
to the fancy, and Blake cannot square this with his response to the
Wordsworth poems he likes best. "Blake was impatient enough
with all this," writes Adams, to declare, "One Power alone
makes a Poet. - Imagination The Divine Vision" (176).
Perhaps the most interesting question about the last
book in which Blake wrote comments, Robert John Thornton's The
Lord's Prayer (1827), is why Blake ever
bothered to read it. Thornton had previously employed Blake to
illustrate Ambrose Philips' versions of Virgil's Pastorals.
The ensuing wood engravings are now recognized as superb works of
art, but they came close to not appearing at all, thanks to
Thornton's doubts about their quality. It took a group of Blake's
fellow artists to persuade Thornton to publish them. Blake must have
resented this, and in addition he must have known that Thornton was
politically conservative. It is unlikely, to say the least, that he
bought Thornton's book. It may be that Blake's friend John Linnell,
who introduced the two, was curious about what Blake would say about
it, and gave him a copy. As Adams remarks in the preceding chapter,
"It appears that books were now and then lent to acquaintances
with the express desire that they annotate them" (160). Blake's
response to Thornton's version of the Lord's Prayer and the
long-winded exposition that accompanies it is unusually aggressive,
even by the standards of Blake's marginalia in general.. Blake's
objections are epitomized in his parody of "Dr. Thornton's Tory
Translation" (190), beginning: "Our Father Augustus Caesar
who art in these thy Substantial Astronomical Telescopic Heavens...."
If Linnell expected verbal fireworks, he got them.
A close examination of what Blake wrote in books by
other people strongly suggests, as Adams implies, that he did not
write them with only himself in mind. It is likely that the books
were shown to or borrowed by friends, that the annotated texts were
the basis of further discussions, and that they should therefore be
considered public as well as private expression. Adams admirably
explains what Blake conveys in his marginalia, and though
Adams declares that he wrote this book primarily for beginners and
students, all readers of Blake's Margins,
whatever their previous knowledge of Blake, will come away from it
with a richer understanding of his thought.
Morton D. Paley is Emeritus Professor of English at the
University of California, Berkeley. His books include The
Continuing City: William Blake's Jerusalem
(Oxford, 1983), The
Traveller in the Evening: The Last Works of William Blake
(Oxford, 2003), and Samuel Taylor Coleridge
and the Fine Arts (Oxford, 2008). He has
also edited Jerusalem
for the Blake Trust (Princeton, 1991).
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